We investigate the equilibria of game theoretic models of network formation that are based on individual actions only.Our approach is grounded in three simple and realistic principles: (1) Link formation should be a binary process of consent.(2) Link formation should be costly.(3) The class of...

We consider game theoretic models of social network formation.In this paper we limit our investigation to game theoretic models of network formation that are based on individual actions only.Our approach is based on three simple and realistic principles: (1) Link formation is a binary process of...

By generalizing the standard solution for 2-person games into n-person cases, this paper develops a new solution concept for cooperative games: the consensus value.We characterize the consensus value as the unique function that satisfies efficiency, symmetry, the quasi dummy property and...

In this paper, we study a two-stage location-then-price game where consumers are distributed piecewise uniformly, each piece being referred to as an interval.Although the firms face a coordination problem, it is obvious that, for any given locations and prices, there is a unique indifferent...

In this paper we consider open-loop Nash equilibria of the linear-quadratic differential game.As well the finite-planning-horizon, the infinite-planning horizon as convergence properties of the finite-planning-horizon equilibrium if the planning horizon is extended to infinity are...

AMS classification: 90D12

This note characterizes ordinal potential games by the absence of weak improvement cycles and an order condition on the strategy space.This order condition is automatically satisfied if the strategy space is countable.

A multi-choice game is a generalization of a cooperative game in which each player has several activity levels.This note provides several characterizations of the extended Shapley value as proposed by Derks and Peters (1993).Three characterizations are based on balanced contributions properties,...