This note provides a formal proof that for the Defender model, with uniformly distributed tastes, the Nash price equilibria exist and, for a given set of positions, that they are unique. We also show that the profit function is well-behaved—continuous and quasi-concave—and that the maximum...

We use the results of three large-scale field experiments to investigate how the depth of a current price promotion affects future purchasing of first-time and established customers. While most previous studies have focused on packaged goods sold in grocery stores, we consider durable goods sold...

During the summer of 2005, the three domestic U.S. automobile manufacturers offered a customer promotion that allowed customers to buy new cars using discount programs formerly offered only to employees. The initial months of the promotion were record sales months for each of the three firms,...

This paper analyzes how a firm should adjust its marketing expenditures and its price to defend its position in an existing market from attack by a competitive new product. Our focus is to provide usable managerial recommendations on the strategy of response. In particular we show that if...

For every new product and service entrant, there are usually many incumbents who must defend their positions in the market. Hence, defensive strategy is as least as critical as new-product strategy. Our 1983 article argued that defensive strategy critically depends on the distribution of buyer...

Brand positioning and brand pricing are important strategic decisions for marketing managers. Such decisions are interrelated and depend upon competitive brand positions and prices. However, any unilateral decisions may encourage repositioning and price adjustment by competitors thus leading to...

This paper analyzes how a firm should adjust its marketing expenditures and its price to defend its position in an existing market from attack by a competitive new product. Our focus is to provide usable managerial recommendations on the strategy of response. In particular we show that if...