We explore a model of equilibrium selection in coordination games, where agents stochastically adjust their strategies to changes in their local environment. Instead of playing perturbed best-response, we assume that agents follow a rule of "switching to better strategies more likely". We relate...

We examine the design of incentive-compatible screening mechanisms for dynamic environments in which the agents' types follow a (possibly non-Markov) stochastic process, decisions may be made over time and may affect the type process, and payoffs need not be time-separable. We derive a formula...

These notes examine the problem of how to extend envelope theorems to infinite-horizon dynamic mechanism design settings, with an application to the design of bandit auctions.

This paper examines the problem of how to design incentive-compatible mechanisms in environments in which the agents' private information evolves stochastically over time and in which decisions have to be made in each period. The environments we consider are fairly general in that the agents'...

These notes examine the problem of how to extend envelope theorems to infinite-horizon dynamic mechanism design settings, with an application to the design of "bandit auctions."

We examine the design of incentive-compatible screening mechanisms for dynamic environments in which the agents types follow a (possibly non-Markov) stochastic process, decisions may be made over time and may affect the type process, and payoffs need not be time-separable. We derive a formula...

These notes examine the problem of how to extend envelope theorems to infinite-horizon dynamic mechanism design settings, with an application to the design of "bandit auctions."