The Bali Action Plan (BAP) indicated the importance of “measurable, reportable and verifiable” (MRV) greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation actions and commitments, as well as support for GHG mitigation actions, in the post-2012 climate framework. Negotiations underway for this framework have...

The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its Kyoto Protocol established reporting requirements for Parties. This has resulted in comprehensive and timely information on national greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from Annex I Parties, periodic reporting of other information from...

The current monitoring, reporting and review framework under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has a number of strengths and weaknesses. Weaknesses include inconsistent and/or incomplete self reporting of financial support; infrequent reporting; limited and incomplete...

The Bali Action Plan (BAP) language on “measurable, reportable and verifiable” (MRV) greenhouse gas mitigation actions and commitments for a post-2012 climate framework was introduced to apply both to developed countries’ greenhouse gas (GHG) commitments and actions (paragraph 1(b)(i) of...

This report is a part of a series of reports from the Climate Bonus project. The report illustrates the basic structure of a system that could produce strict and reliable data needed for generating product-oriented carbon footprints in Finland. It also represents a road map for developing the...

I study a persuasion game between a privately informed agent and a decision maker (DM) who can imperfectly verify the statements made by the agent by observing a signal that is correlated with the agent's information. I find that whether or not the DM benefits from communicating with the agent...

Through an experiment this study investigates the effects that verification has on honest traders. This paper demonstrates that by reducing the scope for trust verification can have a negative effect on the behaviour of honest individuals. Specifically, the analysis shows that trustworthy agents...

I study a persuasion game between a privately informed agent and a decision maker (DM) who can imperfectly verify the statements made by the agent by observing a signal that is correlated with the agent's information. I find that whether or not the DM benefits from communicating with the agent...

I consider the interaction between an agent and a principal who is unable to commit not to renegotiate. The agent's type only affects the principal's utility. The principal has access to a public signal, correlated with the agent's type, which can be used to (imperfectly) verify the agent's...