Two major methods of explaining economic institutions, namely by strategic choices or through (indirect) evolution, are compared for the case of a homogenous quadratic duopoly market. Sellers either can provide incentives for agents to care for sales, or evolve as sellers who care for sales in...

We give a simple example to the non-existence of duopoly equilibrium in pure strategies in an economy with two goods and two types of consumers.

This paper examines the theorical rationale for a new form of organisation appearing in the car industry. This form is characterised by horizontal as well as vertical communication, incentives based on ability rather than on productivity, and a cooperation of the divisions of large corporations....

We show in a differential game of a differentiated product doupoly model of price competition with costly production adjustment that when firms are symmetric the leadership attempt by each firm turns into Stackelberg price warfare yielding a (MArkov perfect) steady state outcome more competitive...