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Reversibility in dynamic coordination problems
Kováč, Eugen; Steiner, Jakub - In: Games and Economic Behavior 77 (2013) 1, pp. 298-320
anticipate strategically relevant information. Because of the uncertainty and learning, (ir)reversibility of actions has …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049901
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Reversibility in Dynamic Coordination Problems
Kovac, Eugen; Steiner, Jakub - Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education and … - 2008
Agents at the beginning of a dynamic coordination process (1) are uncertain about actions of their fellow players and (2) anticipate receiving strategically relevant information later on in the process. In such environments, the (ir)reversibility of early actions plays an important role in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005086646
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Learning in the WTO/DDA negotiations? : an experimental study
Sung, Hankyoung - In: Journal of East Asian economic integration 19 (2015) 3, pp. 243-273
The purpose of this paper is to identify learning in games in experimental economic settings, and apply their results … that learning about power is dominant over learning from simple repetition in Veto games. Additionally, this paper shows …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011572871
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Contagion through learning
Steiner, Jakub; Stewart, Colin - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 3 (2008) 4, pp. 431-458
We study learning in a large class of complete information normal form games. Players continually face new strategic … situations and must form beliefs by extrapolation from similar past situations. We characterize the long-run outcomes of learning … in learning may generate contagion of actions across games even if players learn only from games with payoffs very close …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011700119
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Time inconsistency and learning in bargaining games
Akin, Zafer - In: International Journal of Game Theory 36 (2007) 2, pp. 275-299
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005375531
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Signaling in deterministic and stochastic settings
Jeitschko, Thomas D.; Normann, Hans-Theo - 2011
We contrast a standard deterministic signaling game with one where the signal-generating mechanism is stochastic. With stochastic signals a unique equilibrium emerges that involves separation and has intuitive comparative-static properties as the degree of signaling depends on the prior type...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010307240
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Contagion through learning
Steiner, Jakub; Stewart, Colin - In: Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) 4, pp. 431-458
We study learning in a large class of complete information normal form games. Players continually face new strategic … situations and must form beliefs by extrapolation from similar past situations. We characterize the long-run outcomes of learning … in learning may generate contagion of actions across games even if players learn only from games with payoffs very close …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599409
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Reversibility in Dynamic Coordination Problems
Kovac, Eugen; Steiner, Jakub - School of Economics, University of Edinburgh - 2008
Agents at the beginning of a dynamic coordination process (1) are uncertain about actions of their fellow players and (2) anticipate receiving strategically relevant information later on in the process. In such environments, the irreversibility of early actions plays an important role in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005369079
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Signaling in deterministic and stochastic settings
Jeitschko, Thomas D.; Normann, Hans-Theo - Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), … - 2011
We contrast a standard deterministic signaling game with one where the signal-generating mechanism is stochastic. With stochastic signals a unique equilibrium emerges that involves separation and has intuitive comparative-static properties as the degree of signaling depends on the prior type...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009368116
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Agent-Based Computational Economics: A Constructive Approach to Economic Theory
Tesfatsion, Leigh - Department of Economics, Iowa State University - 2006
primacy of survival; strategic rivalry and market power; behavioral uncertainty and learning; the role of conventions and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004997725