Welfare in a two-product Cournot oligopoly is shown to increase (decrease) with an increase incorrelation between unit costs when the outputs complement (substitute) in demand. A morequalified correlation structure is required for the result to apply in a three-product Cournotoligopoly when...

The purpose of this paper is to develop a simple model of oligopoly that can be used to examine the effect on production, pricing and welfare of two groups of firms having different production costs. All firms are assumed to produce a homogeneous good, compete on quantities and firms within the...

We revisit the two-stage duopoly game with strategic delegation and asymmetric technologies of Sen and Stamatopoulos (2015). We show that their conclusions are misled by the restrictive assumption that the extent of delegation to managers is restricted to a binary set. Allowing for a continuous...

This paper considers the collusive stability of downstream competition in a vertical market with network externalities and cost asymmetry. A dynamic collusion game is constructed, and backward induction is employed to solve the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. We show that larger network...

We use a unique dataset of bond downgrades from a niche rating company that has been found to be reacting faster to publicly available information than its competitors. Using regime-switching models we propose risk measures to quantify stock return disturbances (distress costs) associated with...

While smooth exact potential games are easily characterized in terms of the cross-derivatives of players' payoff functions, an analogous differentiable characterization of ordinal or generalized ordinal potential games has been elusive for a long time. In this paper, it is shown that the...

In the class of smooth non-cooperative games, exact potential games and weighted potential games are known to admit a convenient characterization in terms of cross-derivatives (Monderer and Shapley, 1996a). However, no analogous characterization is known for ordinal potential games. The present...

More regulation, not less, is temporarily necessary, if effective competition is to be established in network industries. This paradox places new requirements on computable models: they should provide realistic descriptions of technologies but also of market and institutions. Industrial...

In the case of natural duopoly, we suggest a finitely repeated game between two incumbent firms and a potential entrant that limits the incumbent firms' power and compels them to approach economic efficiency. We prove that such a game admits a perfect subgame equilibrium along which the...

While smooth exact potential games are easily characterized in terms of the cross-derivatives of players' payoff functions, an analogous differentiable characterization of ordinal or generalized ordinal potential games has been elusive for a long time. In this paper, it is shown that the...