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Truth, trust, and sanctions: On institutional selection in sender-receiver games

Peeters, Ronald; Vorsatz, Marc; Walzl, Markus - 2011

We conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate the impact of institutions and institutional choice on truth …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010294822

Truth, trust, and sanctions : on institutional selection in sender-receiver games

Peeters, Ronald; Vorsatz, Marc; Walzl, Markus - 2011

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009544505

Truth, trust, and sanctions : on institutional selection in sender-receiver games

Peeters, Ronald; Vorsatz, Marc; Walzl, Markus - 2011

We conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate the impact of institutions and institutional choice on truth …-monetary costs when being lied to as receivers and one consisting of payoff maximizers. -- experiment ; sender-receiver games …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009737511

Truth, trust, and sanctions : on institutional selection in sender-receiver games

Peeters, Ronald; Vorsatz, Marc; Walzl, Markus - 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003647589

Truth-telling and trust in sender-receiver games with intervention : an experimental study

Gurdal, Mehmet Y.; Ozdogan, Ayca; Sağlam, İsmail - In: Review of economic design : RED 18 (2014) 2, pp. 83-103

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365517

Timing of predictions in dynamic cheap talk : experts vs. quacks

Smirnov, Aleksei; Starkov, Egor - 2019

The paper studies a dynamic communication game in the presence of adverse selection and career concerns. A forecaster of privately known competence, who cares about his reputation, chooses the timing of the forecast regarding the outcome of some future event. We find that in all equilibria in a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012123351