We consider agents playing a linear network game with strategic complementarities. We analyse the problem of a policy … maker who can change the structure of the network in order to increase the aggregate efforts of the individuals and/or the … sum of their utilities, given that the number of links of the network has to remain fixed. We identify some link …

We address the problem of a planner looking for the efficient network when agents play a network game with local … complementarities and links are costly. We show that for general network cost functions, efficient networks belong to the class of … Nested-Split Graphs. Next, we refine our results and find that, depending on the specification of the network cost function …

We address the problem of a planner looking for the efficient network when agents play a network game with local … complementarities and links are costly. We show that for general network cost functions, efficient networks belong to the class of … Nested-Split Graphs. Next, we refine our results and find that, depending on the specification of the network cost function …

We address the problem of a planner looking for the efficient network when agents play a network game with local … complementarities and links are costly. We show that for general network cost functions, efficient networks belong to the class of … Nested-Split Graphs. Next, we refine our results and find that, depending on the specification of the network cost function …

We develop a dynamic network formation model that can explain the observed nestedness in real-world networks. Links are … identify the networks to which the network formation process converges and find that they are nested split graphs. We … by real-world networks. Using four different network datasets, we empirically test our model and show that it fits well …

A principal offers bilateral contracts to a set of agents organized in a network conveying synergies, in a context … optimal contracts as a function of agents' positions on the network. The analysis shows that contract enforceability is key to … contract with a single agent on the network. Last, we extend this setting to network entry. …