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Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium
Mezzetti, Claudio; Renou, Ludovic - Department of Economics, Leicester University - 2009
profile. This definition generalizes Maskin’s definition of Nash implementation in that it does not require each optimal … Maskin’s monotonicity, is necessary for implementation. We provide sufficient conditions for implementation and show that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004961262
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Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium
Mezzetti, Claudio; Renou, Ludovic - Department of Economics, University of Warwick - 2009
profile. This definition generalizes Maskin’s definition of Nash implementation in that it does not require each optimal … Maskin’s monotonicity, is necessary for implementation. We provide sufficient conditions for implementation and show that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004965553
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Rationalizable implementation of correspondences
Kunimoto, Takashi; Serrano, Roberto - 2016
rationalizable implementation. Set-monotonicity is much weaker than Maskin monotonicity, which is the key condition for Nash … implementation and which also had been shown to be necessary for rationalizable implementation of social choice functions. Set …-monotonicity reduces to Maskin monotonicity in the case of functions. We conclude that the conditions for rationalizable implementation are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011669323
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Rationalizable implementation of correspondences
Kunimoto, Takashi; Serrano, Roberto - 2016 - This version: May 2016
rationalizable implementation. Set-monotonicity is much weaker than Maskin monotonicity, which is the key condition for Nash … implementation and which also had been shown to be necessary for rationalizable implementation of social choice functions. Set …-monotonicity reduces to Maskin monotonicity in the case of functions. We conclude that the conditions for rationalizable implementation are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011483605
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Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium
Mezzetti, Claudio; Renou, Ludovic - Department of Economics, Faculty of Business and Economics - 2012
We study the gains from trade in a model with endogenously variable markups. We show that the pro-competitive gains from trade are large if the economy is characterized by (i) extensive misallocation, i.e., large ineciencies associated with markups, and (ii) a weak pattern of cross-country...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010903400
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Implementation in Minimax Regret Equilibrium
Renou, Ludovic; Schlag, Karl H. - Department of Economics, Leicester University - 2009
This note studies the problem of implementing social choice correspondences in environments where individuals have doubts about the rationality of their opponents. We postulate the concept of "-minimax regret as our solution concept and show that social choice correspondences that are Maskin...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008565761
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Domains of social choice functions on which coalition strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity are equivalent
Takamiya, Koji - 2006
It is known that on some social choice and economic domains, a social choice function is coalition strategy-proof if and only if it is Maskin monotonic (e.g. Muller and Satterthwaite, 1977). This paper studies the foundation of those results. I provide a set of conditions which is sufficient for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332423
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Repeated Nash implementation
Mezzetti, Claudio; Renou, Ludovic - In: Theoretical Economics 12 (2017) 1, pp. 249-285
We study the repeated implementation of social choice functions in environments with complete information and changing … is necessary and almost sufficient for repeated Nash implementation, regard less of whether the horizon is finite or …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010069
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Maximal Domains for Strategy-proof or Maskin Monotonic Choice Rules
Bochet, Olivier; Storcken, Ton - Department Volkswirtschaftlehre, Universität Bern - 2008
Domains of individual preferences for which the well-known impossibility Theorems of Gibbard-Satterthwaite and Muller-Satterthwaite do not hold are studied. First, we introduce necessary and sufficient conditions for a domain to admit non-dictatorial, Pareto efficient and either strategy-proof...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005812704
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Quantum mechanism helps agents combat Pareto-inefficient social choice rules
Wu, Haoyang - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010
Quantum strategies have been successfully applied in game theory for years. However, as a reverse problem of game theory, the theory of mechanism design is ignored by physicists. In this paper, we generalize the classical theory of mechanism design to a quantum domain and obtain two results: 1)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008529269