We study how competition between banks and non-banks affects lending standards. Banks have private information about some borrowers and are subject to capital requirements to mitigate risk-taking incentives from deposit insurance. Non-banks are uninformed and market forces determine their...

This paper studies how investor heterogeneity determines equilibrium debt maturity in a model with default. The traditional representative investor assumption is a special case where a weak form of the Modigliani-Miller theorem holds; allocations with either all long- or all short-term debt are...

We study how adverse selection distorts equilibrium investment allocations in a Walrasian credit market with two-sided heterogeneity. Representative investor and partial equilibrium economies are special cases where investment allocations are distorted above perfect information allocations. By...

This paper shows that credit default swaps (CDS) can affect the type of debt firms issue. Firms face a trade-off between investment scale and the cost of capital measured by the credit spread. Small-scale investment is safe, fully collateralized, but earns modest profits in all states....

This paper highlights two new effects of credit default swap markets (CDS) in a general equilibrium setting. First, when firms' cash flows are correlated, CDSs impact the cost of capital{credit spreads{and investment for all firms, even those that are not CDS reference entities. Second, when...

We study how competition between banks and non-banks affects lending standards. Banks have private information about some borrowers and are subject to capital requirements to mitigate risk-taking incentives from deposit insurance. Non-banks are uninformed and market forces determine their...