Examples abound in economics, politics and society where agents can enter partial cooperation schemes, i.e. they can collude with a subset of agents. Several constributions devoted to specific settings have claimed that such partial cooperation actually worsens welfare compared to the...

Cet article etudie l'impact du pouvoir de marche des entreprises sur le taux de chomage d'equilibre. La premiere partie expose les fondements microeconomiques du pouvoir de marche des entreprises, dans une perspective a la fois empirique et theorique. La deuxieme partie montre que les modeles...

The systematic use of experience rating is an original feature of the U.S. unemployment benefit system. At first glance, it is likely that experience rating is not desirable in many European labor markets characterized by high firing costs.

In this article, we model a mechanism that makes delegation of authority from a firm to a collective of workers profitable. Power is exchanged for loyalty. The model is tested using a matched panel of French workers and firms. For these firms, we know at two dates (1986 and 1992) whether a...

We analyze how wage setting institutions and job-security provisions interact on unemployment. The assumption that wages are renegotiated by mutual agreement only is introduces in a matching model with endogenous job destruction a la Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) in order to get wage profiles...