What determines CEO incentives? A confusion exists among both academics and practitioners about how to measure the strength of CEO incentives, and how to reconcile the enormous differences in pay sensitivities between executives in large and small firms. We show that while one measure of CEO...

This document contains a collection of 99 exam questions from the last 20 years of the Coordination, Control, and the Management of Organizations (CCMO) course. They are given to students at the end of the semester as a vehicle to aid their study for the final exam. These questions are a...

The ten year survival rate for firms trading on the New York and American Stock Exchanges between 1963 and 1995 is only 61%. This paper explores the process by which firms come to be delisted. We calculate the returns of firms from ten years before delisting to their delisting date and show...

Objective measures of performance are seldom perfect. In response, incentive contracts often include important subjective components that mitigate incentive distortions caused by imperfect objective measures. This paper explores the combined use of subjective and objective performance measures...

We assert that decision rights in organizations are not contractible: the boss can always overturn a subordinate's decision, so formal authority resides only at the top. Although decision rights cannot be formally delegated, they might be informally delegated through self-enforcing relational...

A thorough understanding of internal incentive structures is critical to developing a viable theory of the firm, since these incentives determine to a large extent how individuals inside an organization behave. Many common features of organizational incentive systems are not easily explained by...

What determines CEO incentives? A confusion exists among both academics and practitioners about how to measure the strength of CEO incentives and how to reconcile the enormous differences in pay sensitivities between executives in large and small firms. We show that while one measure of CEO...

We combine Simon's conception of relational contracts with Grossman and Hart's focus on asset ownership. We analyze whether transactions should occur under vertical integration or non-integration, and with or without self-enforcing relational contracts. These four models allow us to re-run the...

Explaining patterns of asset ownership in the economy is a central goal of both organizational economics and industrial organization. We develop a model of asset ownership in trucking, which we test by examining how the adoption of different classes of on-board computers (OBCs) between 1987 and...