In this paper we develop a differentiable approach to deal with incentives in a, possibly small, subset of a general domain of preferences in economies with one public and one private good. We show that, for two agents, there is no social rule which is efficient, nondictatorial and...

In this paper we present a set of axioms guaranteeing that, in exchange economies with or without indivisible goods, the set of Nash, Strong and active Walrasian Equilibria all coincide in the framework of market games.

So far, the Theory of Distributive Justice has tried to single out a unique criterion of Justice. In our opinion, we live in a world in which different people hold conflicting ideas about justice. We propose a procedure for representing these individual opinions, by means of what we call...

In this paper we explore the notion that players are decent, in the sensethat their choices are bound by certain unwritten social rules. We apply thisidea to two cases: bankruptcy and bargaining in exchange economies. Wecharacterize the results that are generated by such a behavior in the cases...

We perform an experimental test of Maskin's canonical mechanism for Nash implementation, using 3 subjects in non-repeated groups, as well as 3 outcomes, states of nature, and integer choices. We find that this mechanism succesfully implements the desired outcome a large majority of the time and...

In this paper we analyze the implementation of socially optimal mergers when the regulator is not informed about all parameters that determine social and private gains from potential mergers. We show that implementation requires a certain degree of agreement between social and private...

In this paper we explore the notion that players are “decent” in the sense that their choices are bounded by certain unwritten social rules. We apply this idea to problems of Bankruptcy and Implementation. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004