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The results of an experiment are reported where subjects played within a repeated random matching environment a simple game in extensive form. In this game backward induction based on the focal-point outcome in subgame yields an outcome different from the one that would be deduced using forward...
We call a set of strategies "uniformly evolutionary stable" if the following holds after a small mutation of a monomorphic population playing a strategy in the set: a) No mutant strategy can spread. b) Mutant strategies not in the set will be driven out. c) The meaning of a "small mutation" can...
We extend the notions of evolutionary stability and, for the first time, that of neutral stability to asymmetric games played between two populations. Stability with respect to simultaneous entry of a small proportion of mutants into both populations is considered. Allocations where neither...
We use the approach of the reduced Game Property and its converse to characterize the sets of stable and semistable demand vectors. It is shown that although these two concepts are generally very different their axiomatizations are almost the same. Regarding the semistable demand vector we...
In the present paper we discuss the notion of values for games with coalition structure, applying the approach suggested by Hart and Mas-Colell (1985) concerning the consistency property and the potential function. An axiomatic formulation of the values by this approach leads to two known values...
The multilinear extension has been shown to be an effective tool for computing the Shapley value of an n-person game. We modify here the method of the multilinear extension to calculate the modified (coalition) value for such games.