We consider the cost of providing incentives through tournaments when workers are inequity averse and performance evaluation is costly. The principal never benefits from empathy between the workers, but he may benefit from their propensity for envy depending on the costs of assessing...

We analyze a two-task work environment with risk-neutral but inequality averse individuals. For the agent employed in task 2 effort is verifiable, while in task 1 it is not. Accordingly, agent 1 receives an incentive contract which, due to his wealth constraint, leads to a rent that the other...

We compare the wage costs of providing incentives through group versus individual bonus schemes. When workers are envious, either scheme may be the least cost one owing to the trade-off between the dissatisfaction with the prospect of unequal pay and the incentives it generates Nous comparons...

This paper analyzes the incentive properties of the standard and burden of proof for a finding of negligence, when evidence about injurers' behavior is imperfect and rests with the parties. We show that the `preponderance of evidence' standard used in common law, together with ordinary exclusion...

We argue that the common law standard of proof, given the rules of evidence, does not minimize expected error as usually argued in the legal literature, but may well be efficient from the standpoint of providing maximal incentives for socially desirable behavior. By contrast, civil law's higher...

Two firms produce a good with a horizontal and a vertical characteristic called quality. The difference in the unobservable quality levels determines how the firms share the market. We consider two scenarios: In the first one, firms disclose quality; in the second one, they send costly signals...

This article develops a simple model using the economist's toolkit to analyze the mechanism of judicial proof. The survey focuses on the notions of burden of proof, legal presumptions, standard of proof, on legal procedure and on the judge's role during the proceedings. The rules of proof are...

I examine the case where fulfillment of a contractual commitment is only imperfectly verifiable and ask whether the court should then "tell the truth"" regarding the action in dispute. I show that truth seeking does not maximize the expected surplus from contractual relationships. From the...