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It is increasingly observable that in different industries competitors jointly acquire and share customer data. We propose a modified Hotelling model with two-dimensional consumer heterogeneity to analyze the incentives for such agreements and their welfare implications. In our model the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010285763
It is increasingly observable that competitors in different industries share customer data, which can be used for targeted pricing. We propose a modified Hotelling model with two-dimensional consumer heterogeneity to analyze the incentives for such sharing and its ensuing welfare effects. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009558236
It is increasingly observable that in different industries competitors jointly acquire and share customer data. We propose a modified Hotelling model with two-dimensional consumer heterogeneity to analyze the incentives for such agreements and their welfare implications. In our model the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009261308
We investigate how firms' incentives to acquire customer data for targeted offers depend on its quality. A two-dimensional Hotelling model is proposed where consumers are heterogeneous both with respect to their locations and transportation cost parameters (flexibility). Firms have perfect data...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010204781
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009732792
We present a model with firms selling (homogeneous) products in two imperfectly segmented markets (a high-demand and a low-demand market). Buyers are mobile but restricted by transportation costs, so that imperfect arbitrage occurs when prices differ in both markets. We show that equilibria are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010271113
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377251
We re-consider the bilateral bargaining problem of a multi-product, manufacturer-retailer trading relationship. O'Brien and Shaffer (Rand JE 35:573-598, 2005) have shown that the unbundling of contracts leads to downward distorted production levels if seller power is strong, while otherwise the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012139155
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012227817
Katz (1987), DeGraba (1990), and Yoshida (2000) have formulated theories that price discrimination bans in intermediary goods markets tend to have positive effects on allocative, dynamic and productive efficiency, respectively. We show that none of these results is robust vis-à-vis endogenous...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009757897