We calculate equilibria of dynamic double-auction markets in which agents aredistinguished by their preferences and information. Over time, agents are privatelyinformed by bids and offers. Investors are segmented into groups that differ withrespect to characteristics determining information...

We solve for the equilibrium dynamics of information sharing in a large pop-ulation. Each agent is endowed with signals regarding the likely outcome of arandom variable of common concern. Individuals choose the effort with whichthey search for others from whom they can gather additional...

We solve for the equilibrium dynamics of information sharing in a large population. Each agent is endowed with signals regarding the likely outcome of a random variable of common concern. Individuals choose the effort with which they search for others from whom they can gather additional...

We calculate equilibria of dynamic double-auction markets in which agents are distinguished by their preferences and information. Over time, agents are privately informed by bids and offers. Investors are segmented into groups that differ with respect to characteristics determining information...