We consider a cooperative model of bargaining where the location of thedisagreement point may be uncertain. Based on the maximin criterion, we formulate anex ante effciency condition and characterize the class of bargaining solutions satisfyingthis axiom...

This paper provides an analysis of individual and social decision criteria foralternatives that are composed of several attributes. We derive additive and multiplicativecriteria for individual decision-making with new axioms and apply these criteria toobtain new justications of known social...

This paper illustrates the application of functional-equations results in population ethics.In an intertemporal framework, we provide characterizations of several classes of variablepopulationsocial orderings that may depend on individual lengths of life in addition tolifetime utilities...

We analyze the rationalizability of variable-population social-choice functions in a welfaristframework. It is shown that xed-population rationalizability and a weakening ofcongruence together are necessary and suffcient for rational choice, given a plausible dominanceproperty that prevents the...

This note provides an alternative proof of a known result on the existenceof collections of orderings generating intersection quasi-orderings. Instead of proving theresult from rst principles, it is illustrated how it can be obtained by making use of ananalogous relationship between partial...

Discounting the utilities of future people or giving smaller weights to groups other thanone's own is often criticized on the grounds that the resulting objective function diers fromthe ethically appropriate one...

This paper provides an axiomatic approach to the problem of measuring the informationcontained in opportunity sets. In many choice situations, the items that can be selectedfrom an opportunity set (the objects of choice) do not coincide with the consequencesthey induce (the objects a...

This note investigates the extension of Roberts' price-independent welfare prescriptions toalternatives in which population size and composition can vary. We show that ethicallyunsatisfactory orderings result. Suppose that a single person is to be added to a populationthat is unaected in utility...

In pure population problems, a single resource is to be distributed equally among theagents in a society, and the social planner chooses population size(s) and per-capita consumption(s) for each resource constraint and set of feasible population sizes within thedomain of the solution...

A contingent contract in a transferable utility game under uncertainty specifies an outcome for each possible state. It is assumed that coalitions evaluate these contracts by considering the minimal possible excesses. A main question of the paper concerns the existence and characterization of...