Using a model with moral hazard and bankruptcy costs, we show that the direction of intertemporal trade between countries depends on differences in their autarkic distributions of wealth. We also examine the consequences of redistribution policies and bail-out policies in this framework. We show...

This paper explores the incentive effects of a renewal clause in a lease. The basis of selection is rank-order performance. The authors' findings, in the context of a principal-agent model, are as follows. In order to extract greater effort from tenants (i.e., agents), the landlord (the...

We provide a theory of informal communication-cheap talk-between firms and capital markets that incorporates the role of agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. The analysis suggests that a policy of discretionary disclosure that encourages managers to attract the market's attention...

This paper studies the possibility of endogenous fluctuations caused by activities of financial intermediaries. Risk-averse agents borrow from banks and invest in a risky two-state capital technology. The probability of success with the technology is assumed to be decreasing in the amount of...

This paper shows that sale of assets for partial repayment of debt during financial distress may act as a signaling mechanism helping firms to obtain better terms of exchange in debt-equity swap. Although ex-post beneficial, it causes under-investment, ex-ante.

We construct a model to show that active financial intermediation can induce economic fluctuations. We embed a financial sector in a simple overlapping generation model with a single stock of capital. Individuals are risk averse agents that face idiosyncratic risks in their business activities:...