A macro model is developed incorporating the productive effects of public expenditure, but also allowing for congestion. The Pigouvian tax rate to correct for the distortion caused by congestion is found and the optimal level of public expenditure is characterized.

In low-income countries privatization, if implemented appropriately, may play an important role in generating growth. Using data recently available from Central and Eastern Europe, we therefore investigate the impact of alternative methods of privatization on economic growth. Our analysis...

A macro model is developed incorporating the productive effects of public expenditure, but also allowing for congestion. The Pigouvian tax rate to correct for the distortion caused by congestion is found and the optimal level of public expenditure is characterized.

We provide a new rationale for commercial activities by non-profit organizations whose primary concern is to supply mission output. We show that investment in commercial activity may be used to insure mission output against the uncertainty of donations, though possibly at the cost of lower...

We analyze the contracting out of public service provision to private firms and compare the performance of for-profit and non-for-profit firms. We consider two alternative settings.In the first,the firm has control rights, as under the UK's Private Finance Initiative(PFI). In the second,the...

We use an incomplete-contract approach to compare contracting out by a public sector agency with the delegation of contracting out to a public-private partnership(PPP) that is a joint venture between private and sector agents. The PPP maximizes a linear combination of profit and social benefit....

In low-income countries privatization, if implemented appropriately, may play an important role in generating growth. Using data recently available from Central and Eastern Europe, we therefore investigate the impact of alternative methods of privatization on economic growth. Our analysis...

In an incomplete contract setting, we analyze the contracting out of public service provision, comparing the performance of for-profit and not-for-profit private firms. Two institutional arrangements are considered, control rights lying either with the firm as under the UK's Private Finance...

We model entry by entrepreneurs into new markets in developing economies with regulatory barriers in the form of licence fees and bureaucratic delay. Because laissez faire leads to ‘excessive’ entry, a licence fee can increase welfare by discouraging entry. However, in the presence of a...

We model public-private partnershios in building and managing facilities for the provision of public services. In particular,we analyze both the desirability of bundling the building and management operations, and the optimal allocation of ownership between the public sector and private firms....