We model entry by entrepreneurs into new markets in developing economies with regulatory barriers in the form of licence fees and bureaucratic delay. Because laissez faire leads to 'excessive' entry, a licence fee can increase welfare by discouraging entry. However, in the presence of a licence...

We model entry by entrepreneurs into new markets in developing economies with regulatory barriers in the form of licence fees and bureaucratic delay. Because laissez faire leads to 'excessive' entry, a licence fee can increase welfare by discouraging entry. However, in the presence of a licence...

We model entry by entrepreneurs into new markets in developing economies with regulatory barriers in the form of licence fees and bureaucratic delay. Because laissez faire leads to ‘excessive’ entry, a licence fee can increase welfare by discouraging entry. However, in the presence of a...

We model entry by entrepreneurs into new markets in developing economies with regulatory barriers in the form of licence fees and bureaucratic delay. Because laissez faire leads to 'excessive' entry, a licence fee can increase welfare by discouraging entry. However, in the presence of a licence...

For two different regulatory standards, we examine the optimal minimum wage in a competitive labour market when the government is uncertain about supply and demand. Solutions are related to underlying supply and demand conditions, and the extent of uncertainty and of rationing efficiency. We...

We model entry by entrepreneurs into new markets in developing economies with regulatory barriers in the form of licence fees and bureaucratic delay. Because laissez faire leads to quot;excessivequot; entry, a licence fee can increase welfare by discouraging entry. However, in the presence of a...