We model entry by entrepreneurs into new markets in developing economies with regulatory barriers in the form of licence fees and bureaucratic delay. Because laissez faire leads to ‘excessive’ entry, a licence fee can increase welfare by discouraging entry. However, in the presence of a...

An industry is modeled in which entrepreneurs, who are heterogeneous in ability, may produce formally or informally. It is shown how the formalinformal mix depends on the distribution of ability, product demand and various parameter values. The industry equilibrium is compared to one in which...

We examine the interplay between limited public funds and renegotiation when a foreign firm invests in social infrastructure. It is found that the critical factor is how the finance constraint alters the threat point for the government in renegotiation. Through its effect on this threat point, a...

We provide a new explanation for commercial activities by non-profit organizations whose primary concern is to supply mission output. Starting from the observation that donations to individual non-profits are often highly volatile, we show how investment in commercial activity can constitute a...

In an incomplete-contract setting, we analyse the contracting out of public service provision, comparing the performance of for-profit (FP) and not-for-profit (NP) firms. Two institutional arrangements are considered, control rights lying either with the firm (PPP) or the government (traditional...

O17, J23, D81 </AbstractSection> Copyright Bennett et al.; licensee Springer. 2012

An industry is modeled in which entrepreneurs, who are heterogeneous in ability, may produce formally or informally. Two cases are distinguished, with and without labour market segmentation, for which different patterns of formal/informal supply obtain. Without segmentation, informality may...

We analyze a mixed oligopoly with free entry by private firms, assuming that a public firm maximizes an increasing function of output, subject to a break-even constraint. We establish an irrelevance result: whenever a mixed oligopoly is viable, then aggregate output, aggregate costs and welfare...