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This paper introduces various sources of consumer heterogeneity in one-sector representative consumer (RC) growth models and develops tools to study the evolution of the distribution of consumptions, assets, and incomes. These tools are applied to the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model of optimal...
We use variation in oil output among Brazilian municipalities to investigate the effects ofresource windfalls. We find muted effects of oil through market channels: offshore oil has noeffect on municipal non-oil GDP or its composition, while onshore oil has only modest effects onnon-oil GDP...
This bold, imaginative book advances an entirely new theory of voters’ behavior.The starting point for this theory is that individuals are endowed with a set of beliefs, ora worldview, and derive psychological benefits from acting in accordance with these beliefs.However, the beliefs of most...
Empirical evidence suggests that the natural-resource curse operates through the behaviorof the political elite, yet there are few models that convincingly illustrate the mechanismat work. I present a model where natural-resource abundance generates power struggles,thereby increasing the...
We present a theory of ethnic conflict in which coalitions formed along ethnic lines competefor the economy’s resources. The role of ethnicity is to enforce coalition membership: inethnically homogeneous societies members of the losing coalition can defect to the winnersat low cost, and this...
The most striking difference in corporate-governance arrangements between rich andpoor countries is that the latter rely much more heavily on the dynastic family firm,where ownership and control are passed on from one generation to the other. We arguethat if the heir to the family firm has no...
We discuss political economy mechanisms which can explain the resource curse,in which an increase in the size of resource rents causes a decrease in the economy’stotal value added. We identify a number of channels through which resource rentswill alter the incentives of a political leader....