The design of CEO incentives is particularly important for firms in financial distress. We compare the resolution of CEO incentive problems in distressed firms between the 1980s versus the 1990s, focusing on how changes in contractual provisions, as well as in the executive labor market,...

This study examines the antecedents and consequences of analysts choosing to become supply chain analysts (i.e., analysts following both a supplier and its major customer). We find that information complementarities between firms in the same supply chain, between a supplier firm and its industry...

This paper examines why CFOs become involved in material accounting manipulations. We find that while CFOs bear substantial legal costs when involved in accounting manipulations, these CFOs have similar equity incentives to the CFOs of matched non-manipulation firms. In contrast, CEOs of...

This paper examines why CFOs become involved in material accounting manipulations. We find that while CFOs bear substantial legal costs when involved in accounting manipulations, these CFOs have similar equity incentives to the CFOs of matched non-manipulation firms. In contrast, CEOs of...

This paper examines why CFOs become involved in material accounting manipulations. We find that while CFOs bear substantial legal costs when involved in accounting manipulations, these CFOs have similar equity incentives to the CFOs of matched non-manipulation firms. In contrast, CEOs of...

The corporate governance literature generally assumes that shareholders incentives to monitor management depend on how much of the firm the shareholders own. This dissertation proposes that another determinant of monitoring incentive is how long large shareholders intend to hold their shares,...