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Understanding Central Bank loss functions : implied and delegated targets
Yuan, Huiping; Miller, Stephen M. - 2009
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003949764
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Designing central bank loss functions
Yuan, Huiping; Miller, Stephen M. - In: International journal of business and economics 9 (2010) 1, pp. 77-81
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008655600
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Target controllability and time consistency : complement to the Tinbergen rule
Yuan, Huiping; Miller, Stephen M. - 2013
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010344581
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The optimality and controllability of monetary policy through delegation with consistent targets
Yuan, Huiping; Miller, Stephen M.; Chen, Langnan - In: Scottish journal of political economy : the journal of … 58 (2011) 1, pp. 82-106
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009125656
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The optimality and controllability of discretionary monetary policy
Yuan, Huiping; Miller, Stephen M. - 2011
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009380527
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Implementing optimal monetary policy : objectives and rules
Yuan, Huiping; Miller, Stephen M. - In: Economic modelling 27 (2010) 3, pp. 737-745
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003995638
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The making of optimal land consistent policy : an analytical framework for monetary models
Yuan, Huiping (contributor); Miller, Stephen M. (contributor) - 2006
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003292366
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The making of optimal and consistent policy : an implementation theory framework for monetary policy
Yuan, Huiping (contributor); Miller, Stephen M. (contributor) - 2006
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003292379
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A general schema for optimal monetary policymaking : objectives and rules
Yuan, Huiping (contributor); Miller, Stephen M. (contributor) - 2007
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003474277
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Designing Central Bank Loss Functions
Yuan, Huiping - 2010
Kydland and Prescott (1977) show that optimal policy proves inconsistent because of rational expectations. This paper shows that the inconsistency of optimal policy comes from the inconsistency of the social loss function with the economic structure. As a result, we delegate to the central bank...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012759910