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There is a debate on whether executive pay reflects rent extraction due to “managerialpower” or is the result of arms-length bargaining in a principal-agent framework. In this paperwe offer a test of the managerial power hypothesis by empirically examining the CEOcompensation of U.S. public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009418922
There is a debate on whether executive pay reflects rent extraction due to "managerial power" or is the result of arms-length bargaining in a principal-agent framework. In this paper we offer a test of the managerial power hypothesis by empirically examining the CEO compensation of U.S. public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005761844
We study the changes in CEO power and compensation that arise when firms go through financial distress. We use a matching estimator to identify suitable controls and estimate the causal effects of financial distress for a sample of U.S. public companies from 1992 to 2005. We document that,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008472147
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012809611
There is a debate on whether executive pay reflects rent extraction due to "managerial power" or is the result of arms-length bargaining in a principal-agent framework. In this paper we offer a test of the managerial power hypothesis by empirically examining the CEO compensation of U.S. public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003779098
There is a debate on whether executive pay reflects rent extraction due to quot;managerial powerquot; or is the result of arms-length bargaining in a principal-agent framework. In this paper we offer a test of the managerial power hypothesis by empirically examining the CEO compensation of U.S....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012720753
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012805462
We study the dynamics of managerial influence and Chief Executive Officers' (CEOs) compensation over the course of financial distress during 1992 to 2012. Using a matching estimator to identify suitable controls, we find that under distress firms reduce managerial board appointments, intensify...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013048928
There is a debate on whether executive pay reflects rent extraction due to "managerial power" or is the result of arms-length bargaining in a principal-agent framework. In this paper we offer a test of the managerial power hypothesis by empirically examining the CEO compensation of U.S. public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013324758
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013468465