This paper considers the political economy of the mix of profit, investment and saving taxation in a small open economy where agents generally differ in their shares of profit and other income. In this setting, capital income taxation can have the dual role of financing government spending and...

This paper provides an analysis of the proposal for introducing a minimum withholding tax on interest in the EU. We present a model with three countries: a typical EU country, an 'inside' tax haven, and an 'outside' tax haven. In the initial non-cooperative solution, the former two countries...

This paper considers a world of many symmetric countries where public goods in principle are financed by taxes on saving, investment and pureprofits. In theory, countries could use all three taxes in combination. In practice, however, the tax instrument set may be restricted by, for instance,...

This paper considers withholding taxes and information exchange as alternative means to tax international interest income. For each regime, we consider the maximum level of taxation of foreign-source income that can be sustained as the equilibrium of a repeated game. The best regime is the one...

This paper considers the political economy of the mix of profit, investment and saving taxation in a small open economy where agents generally differ in their shares of profit and other income. In this setting, capital income taxation can have the dual role of financing government spending and...

This paper provides an analysis of the proposal for introducing a minimum withholding tax on interest in the EU. We present a model with three countries: a typical EU country, an 'inside' tax haven, and an 'outside' tax haven. In the initial non-cooperative solution, the former two countries...

This paper considers a world of many symmetric countries where public goods in principle are financed by taxes on saving, investment and pureprofits. In theory, countries could use all three taxes in combination. In practice, however, the tax instrument set may be restricted by, for instance,...

This paper investigates the scope for international coordination of capital income and profit taxation. The paper considers a world of many symmetric countries where public goods are financed by taxes on capital income and on profits. In the open economy, the authorities have at their disposal a...

This paper considers withholding taxes and information exchange as alternative means to tax international interest income. For each regime, we consider the maximum level of taxation of foreign-source income that can be sustained as the equilibrium of a repeated game. The best regime is the one...