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Solution uniqueness is an important property for a bargaining model. Rubinstein's (1982) seminal 2-person alternating-offer bargaining game has a unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium outcome. Is it possible to obtain uniqueness results in the much enlarged setting of multilateral bargaining with a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008475659
No abstract received.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004970214
No abstract received.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004970215
The paper deals with standard mathematical models for nonlinear affine control systems with two (vector-valued) inputs u (=control) and w (unknown except for a bound for the sup-norm). Interpretation of this scenario and its wide range of applications (in control and differential game theory):...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004970216
Consider the cooperative coalition games with side payments. Bargaining sets are calculated for all possible coalition structures to obtain a collection of imputations rather than single imputation. Our aim is to obtain a single payoff vector, which is acceptable by all players of the game under...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004970217
In many share problems there is an a priori given a natural set of possible divisions to solve the sharing problem. Cooperative games related to such share sets are introduced, which may be helpful in solving share problems. Relations between properties of share sets and properties of games are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004977737
Under dynamic cooperation a player may use 'irrational' acts to extort additional gains if later circumstances allow. In this article we present a condition under which even if irrational behaviors appear later in the game the concerned player would still be performing better under the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004977738
The literature on normal form games generally depicts the payoff matrices of two or three players. However, many such games discuss n-players. Therefore, this note studies the payoff representations of n-player normal form games.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004977739
In this paper we introduce two simple versions of the hat game for three players and a generalization for n players. We compute the extensive version of the game and all the equilibrium and friendly equilibrium points as a simple example of the structure function.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004977740
We study strategic games where players' preferences are weak orders which need not admit utility representations. First of all, we extend Voorneveld's concept of best-response potential from cardinal to ordinal games and derive the analogue of his characterization result: An ordinal game is a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004977741