Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 132
Cover Image
Efficiency and Collusion Neutrality of Solutions for Cooperative TU-Games
van den Brink, Rene - 2009
use efficiency which is not satisfied by the Banzhaf value. On the other hand, the Banzhaf value satisfies collusion … these axioms characterize the equal division solution. Further, we show that there is no solution that satisfies efficiency …, collusion neutrality and the null player property. Finally, we show that a solution satisfies efficiency, collusion neutrality …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325938
Cover Image
Multi-Player Agents in Cooperative TU-Games
van den Brink, Rene; Dietz, Chris - 2012
A situation in which a finite set of agents can generate certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility (or simply a TU-game) where each agent is represented by one player in the game. In this paper, we assume that one agent can be represented by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326208
Cover Image
Consistency, Monotonicity and Implementation of Egalitarian Shapley Values
van den Brink, René; Funaki, Yukihiko; Ju, Yuan - 2007
One of the main issues in economics is the trade-off between marginalism and egalitarianism. In the context of cooperative games this trade-off can be framed as one of choosing to allocate according to the Shapley value or the equal division solution. In this paper we provide tools that make it...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325573
Cover Image
Axiomatization and Implementation of Discounted Shapley Values
van den Brink, Rene; Funaki, Yukihiko - 2010
player property for delta = 0. We show that efficiency, symmetry, linearity and this delta-reducing player property …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326064
Cover Image
The Prediction Value
Koster, Maurice; Kurz, Sascha; Lindner, Ines; Napel, Stefan - 2013
We introduce the prediction value (PV) as a measure of players' informational importance in probabilistic TU games. The latter combine a standard TU game and a probability distribution over the set of coalitions. Player i's prediction value equals the difference between the conditional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010328331
Cover Image
Axiomatizations of Permission Values for Games with a Hierarchical Permission Structure using Split Neutrality
van den Brink, René - 2003
Recently, cooperative game theory has been applied to various economic allocation problems in which players are not fully anonymous but belong to some relational structure. One of the most developed models in this respect are communications situations or (symmetric) network situations in which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324965
Cover Image
Comparable Axiomatizations of the Myerson Value, the Restricted Banzhaf Value, Hierarchical Outcomes and the Average Tree Solution for Cycle-Free Graph Restricted Games
van den Brink, René - 2009
satisfies collusion neutrality, while the Myerson value satisfies component efficiency. Requiring both efficiency and collusion …. Since these solutions also satisfy the superfluous player property, this also `solves' an impossibility for TU-games since … there is no solution for these games that satisfies efficiency, collusion neutrality and the null player property. We give …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325757
Cover Image
Consistency, Population Solidarity, and Egalitarian Solutions for TU-Games
van den Brink, Rene; Chun, Youngsub; Funaki, Yukihiko; … - 2012
A (point-valued) solution for cooperative games with transferable utility, or simply TU-games, assigns a payoff vector to every TU-game. In this paper we discuss two classes of equal surplus sharing solutions, one consisting of all convex combinations of the equal division solution and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326277
Cover Image
Centrality Rewarding Shapley and Myerson Values for Undirected Graph Games
Khmelnitskaya, Anna; van der Laan, Gerard; Talman, Dolf - 2016
In this paper we introduce two values for cooperative games with communication graph structure. For cooperative games the shapley value distributes the worth of the grand coalition amongst the players by taking into account the worths that can be obtained by any coalition of players, but does...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011586685
Cover Image
From Hierarchies to Levels: New Solutions for Games
Álvarez-Mozos, Mikel; van den Brink, René; van der … - 2015
Recently, applications of cooperative game theory to economic allocation problems have gained popularity. In many of these problems, players are organized according to either a hierarchical structure or a levels structure that restrict players' possibilities to cooperate. In this paper, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011288421