A comprehensive model of economic household decision is presented which incorporates both fully cooperative and fully non-cooperative variants, parameterized by the income distribution, as well as a semi-cooperative variant, parameterized in addition by a vector B, representing the degrees of...

We present a comprehensive model of household economic decision covering both fully cooperative and non-cooperative cases as well as semi- cooperative cases, varying with income distribution and a parameter vector ÷ representing degrees of individual autonomy with respect to the public goods....

We present a comprehensive model of household economic decision covering both full cooperation and noncooperation as well as semi-cooperative cases, varying with income distribution and a parameter vector <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$\theta $$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"> <math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <mrow> <mi mathvariant="italic">θ</mi> </mrow> </math> </EquationSource> </InlineEquation> representing degrees of individual autonomy with respect to the...</equationsource></equationsource></inlineequation>

We derive distributional effects for a non-cooperative alternative to the unitary model of household behaviour. We consider the Nash equilibria of a voluntary contributions to public goods game. Our main result is that, in general, the two partners either choose to contribute to different public...

We derive distributional effects for a non-cooperative alternative to the unitary model of household behaviour. We consider the Nash equilibria of a voluntary contributions to public goods game. Our main result is that, in general, the two partners either choose to contribute to different public...

We derive distributional effects for a non-cooperative alternative to the unitary model of household behaviour. We consider the Nash equilibria of a voluntary contributions to public goods game. Our main result is that, in general, the two partners either choose to contribute to different public...

We experimentally disentangle two potential sources for endogenous social interactions effects. By comparing groups where the group norm is publicly observable with those where it is not we can measure the size of any endogenous observation effect. By comparing connected with disconnected groups...

In recent years the increase in the divorce rate in many advanced countries and the predominance of female-headed families among the poor has generated much interest in the relationship between divorce and the welfare of mothers and children. In this paper I will review a small body of economic...