In this paper we examine the impact of information on individual contributions in a public-bad experiment. We compare two experimental treatments. In the partial information treatment, subjects are only informed about the total contributions by their group, whereas in the full information...

Recent insights from the ‘embodied cognition’ perspective in cognitive science, supported by neural research, provide a basis for a ‘methodological interactionism’ that transcends both the methodological individualism of economics and the methodological collectivism of (some) sociology,...

Abstract: We report results from three well-known experimental paradigms, where we use time, rather than money, as the salient component of subjects’ incentives. The three experiments, commonly employed to study social preferences, are the dictator game, the ultimatum game and the trust game....

In this paper we axiomatically characterize two recursive procedures for defining a social group.The first procedure starts with the set of all individuals who define themselves as members of the social group, while the starting point of the second procedure is the set of all individuals who are...

Many experimental studies indicate that people are motivated by reciprocity. Rabin (1993) develops techniques for incorporating such concerns into game theory and economics. His model, however, does not fare well when applied to situations with an interesting dynamic structure (like many...

In this paper it is empirically investigated whether feelings of altruism towards members of other generations and senses of justice have an impact on the individual s evaluation of the public pension system. The data have been obtained from a large-scale survey carried out among a...

This paper studies the consequences of asymmetric litigation costs. Under three differ- ent protocols: static legal process, dynamic legal process with exogenous sequencing and dynamic legal process with endogenous sequencing, solutions are obtained for the litigation efforts and the expected...

We present a simple proof of the balancedness of permutation games. In the proof we use the existence of envy-free allocations in economies with indivisible objects, quasi-linear utility functions, and an amount of money.

Economic motives are not the only reasons for committing a (small) crime. People consider social norms and perceptions of fairness before judging a situation and acting upon it. If someone takes a bundle of printing paper from the office for private use at home, then a colleague who sees this...

We experimentally investigate the development of voluntary transfers in an overlapping generations environment. By varying the information conditions of the game, we study whether the development of transfers is related to the possibility of future generations to monitor and reciprocate...