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This article studies the design of optimal mechanisms to regulate entry in natural oligopoly markets, assuming the regulator is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market. We adapt the Clarke-Groves mechanism, characterize the optimal mechanism that maximizes the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010310273
This paper gives an account of events, and explains some systematic reasons of the UMTS auction flop in Switzerland. Apart from general market developments, which could not have been anticipated, we argue that auction design which was introduced in England and adopted in Switzerland and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010310380
The third generation UMTS auction in Germany raised an enormous amount of revenue, and at the same time achieved a more competitive market structure than other UMTS auctions in Europe. The present paper explains the design of that auction, and presents a game theoretic explanation of observed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010310407
We show that, for licensing by an outside innovator in a Cournot oligopoly,royalty licensing can generate higher payoff to the innovator than the fixed-feelicensing and auction if the labor market is unionized...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868601
The spectrum for third generation (3G) mobile communications for the German market was alloted to operators by means of an auction. This resulted in a highly competitive outcome: six operators were given rights to provide 3G services. Government revenues from this auction were a staggering EUR...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005645115
This paper discusses the use of game-theoretic methods in the study of technical change. It focuses on the role of two key incentives: the profit incentive and the competitive threat. These forces, which are outlined in Section 1, feature prominently in the discussion of Sections 2 and 3 on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005671107
One of the most important and most contentious issues for regulation and competition raised by the 1996 Telecommunications Act is when to authorize the regional Bell companies to offer long-distance services. The Department of Justice (DOJ) adopted a standard requiring that a Bell's local market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005625630
This paper extends Stahl (1988) by modelling a sequential price competition among intermediaries when their expected revenue per sale is affected by consumers’s default. If this revenue is non-monotonie with the asking price, theWalrasian outcome may not be an equilibrium and demand rationing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005636070
We experimentally study the inuence of induced group identity on the determination of prices and beliefs in a small market game. We create group identity through a focal point coordination game. Subjects play a three-person bargaining game where one seller can sell an indivisible good to one of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281664
We consider a monopolistic screening model of patent licensing. There is one patentee and one licensee and the patentee wishes to sell a patent of cost reducing technology to the licensee. The patentee is an outsider and the licensee is the only firm in the product market. The licensee possesses...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005518267