The experiment disentangles communication and social effect in face-to-face communication. The results question the previous interpretation of communication effects in ultimatum bargaining, and suggest that separate processes, both of a strategic and of an affective-social nature induce...

The timing effects (timing without observability) identified by Weber, Camerer, and Knez (2004) in coordination game experiments are caused by their fixed-matching protocol. When we use a random-matching protocol the alleged timing effects completely vanish.

The need to pay subjects to participate in experiments places a major financial burden on experimental economists. In this paper, we conduct dictator games and find that there is no difference in the way student subjects split money and extra-credit points, an encouraging result that suggests...

We examine behavior in Cournot and Stackelberg markets in a simple experiment where participants experience both market forms. Moreover, Stackelberg followers have to submit full response strategies. Our main finding is that Stackelberg followers employ rather flat, reciprocal response function,...

We investigate whether framing effects of voluntary contributions are significant in a provision point mechanism. Our results show that framing significantly affects individuals of the same type: cooperative individuals appear to be more cooperative in the public bads game than in the public...

We explore facets of conditional cooperation in a public goods game. First, we replicate the Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr (2001) result that the majority of subjects in public goods experiments are conditional cooperators. Next, given that the majority of subjects in our study are conditional...

This paper refers on an experiment comparing the propensity to punish unfair behavior with the desire to help the victims of unfairness, in presence of a budget constraint and without the expectation of a long-run pecuniary gain. The possibility that subjects' behavior changes when the initial...

We investigate the decisions of individuals in simple and complex environments. We use a version of the Guessing Game (Beauty-contest Game) as a vehicle for our investigation, employing mathematically talented students. We find that our subjects think in complex environments more carefully...

Theoretical work starting with Stigler (1964) suggests that collusion may be difficult to sustain in a repeated game with secret price cuts and demand uncertainty. Compared to equilibria in games of perfect information, trigger-strategy equilibria in this context result in lower payoffs because...

We build on Van Huyck, Gillette and Battalio (1992) and examine the efficacy of credible assignments in a stag-hunt type coordination game with two Pareto-ranked equilibria, one payoff dominant and the other risk dominant. The majority of our subjects fail to coordinate to the payoff dominant...