One of the important solution concepts in cooperative game theory is the Shapley value. The Shapley value is a probabilistic value in which each player subjectively assigns probabilities to the events which define their positions in a game. One of the most important concepts of subjective...

The paper presents a framework in which the most important single-valued solutions in the literature of TU games are jointly analyzed. None of the main results is original.

Lucas and Trall (1963) defined the games in partition function form as a generalization of the cooperative games with transferable utility. In our work we propose by means of an axiomatic characterization a solution for such games in partition function form. This solution will be a...

The paper presents a coalition-structure value that is meant to capture outside options of players in a cooperative game. It deviates from the Aumann-Drèze value by violating the null-player axiom. We use this value as a power index and apply it to weighted majority games.

In this paper reasonable payoff intervals for players in a game in partition function form (p.f.f. game) are introduced and used to define the notion of compromisable p.f.f. game. For a compromisable p.f.f. game a compromise value is defined for which an axiomatic characterization is provided....

This paper looks at society divided into two groups where personal assets as well as group specific values influences the individuals' utility (positively for own group's value and possibly otherwise for the other group's value). Individual resource allocation problem may lead to under...

The purpose of this paper is to review some recent applications of coalitional games in medical research, and to illustrate some related open questions. We point out the fact that many problems which are still object of debate deal with the computation, the statistical comparison and the...

For a finite player cooperative cost game, we consider two solutions that are based on excesses of coalitions. We define per-capita excess-sum of a player as sum of normalized excesses of coalitions involving this player and view it as a measure of player's dissatisfaction. So, per-capita...

The weighted value was introduced by Shapley in 1953 as an asymmetric version of his value. Since then several axiomatizations have been proposed including one by Shapley in 1981 specifically addressed to cost allocation, a context in which weights appear naturally. It was at the occasion of a...

Different axiomatizations of the Shapley value for TU games can be found in the literature. The Shapley value has been generalized in several ways to the class of games in partition function form. In this paper we discuss another generalization of the Shapley value and provide a characterization.