Showing 1 - 10 of 18,431
This paper examines the ability of a policy maker to control equilibrium outcomes in a global coordination game; applications include currency attacks, bank runs, and debt crises. A unique equilibrium is known to survive when the policy is exogenously fixed. We show that, by conveying...
This paper examines the ability of a policy maker to control equilibrium outcomes in a global coordination game; applications include currency attacks, bank runs, and debt crises. A unique equilibrium is known to survive when the policy is exogenously fixed. We show that, by conveying...
This paper studies the interaction between monetary and fiscal authorities while investors are coordinating on a speculative attack. The authorities want to achieve specific targets for output and inflation but also to avoid a regime change (i.e. sovereign default). They use the traditional...
originates in the signaling role of policy choices. A novel procedure of iterated elimination of non-equilibrium strategies is …
originates in the signaling role of policy choices. A novel procedure of iterated elimination of non-equilibrium strategies is …
originates in the signaling role of policy choices. A novel procedure of iterated elimination of non-equilibrium strategies is …
originates in the signaling role of policy choices. A novel procedure of iterated elimination of non-equilibrium strategies is …
originates in the signaling role of policy choices. A novel procedure of iterated elimination of non-equilibrium strategies is …
originates in the signaling role of policy choices. A novel procedure of iterated elimination of non-equilibrium strategies is …
This paper examines how the dynamics of information influences the dynamics of coordination in an environment with strategic complementarities and heterogeneous expectations. We consider a simple dynamic global game of regime change, in which the status quo is abandoned when a sufficiently large...