mutual shareholding. According to our results firstpriceprocurement is quite collusion-proof when allowing for the latter two …

’ bid. Equilibrium behavior in the first-price auction is mostly unaffected but there are multiple equilibria in the second …- price auction. Consequently, comparative statics across price rules are equivocal. Experimentally, leaks in the first- price … auction favor second movers but harm first movers and sellers, as theoretically predicted. Low to medium leak probabilities …

first movers bids. There is a unique equilibrium in the first-price auction and multiple equilibria in the second …-price auction. Consequently, comparative statics across price rules are equivocal. We experimentally find that in the first …-price auction, leaks benefit second movers but harm first movers and sellers. Low to medium probabilities of leak eliminate the …

This paper explores the impact of debarment as a deterrent of collusion in first-price procurement auctions. We develop … a procurement auction model where bidders can form bidding rings, and derive the bidding and collusive behavior under no … both reduce collusion and bids. The deterrent effect of debarment increases in its length. However, the debarment of …

We contribute to the literature on the optimal design of auction mechanisms for the procurement of nature conservation … decreases with repetition. Theory predicts that repetition facilitates collusion among sellers in procurement auctions, while …

This paper contributes to the study of tacit collusion by analyzing infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price … which the monopoly outcome with equal sharing is sustainable in the uniform price auction, but not in the corresponding … discriminatory auction. Moreover, capacity withholding may be necessary to sustain this outcome. We extend these results to the case …