We derive a simple formula for the cost of the ESO to the firm at the grant date under the assumption that the executive has a constant market-to-strike multiple. The market-to-strike multiple is defined as the ratio of the market price on exercise to the strike price of the ESO. The expected...

Traditional stock option grant is the most common form of incentive pay in executive compensation. Applying a principal-agent analysis, we find this common practice suboptimal and firms are better off linking incentive pay to average stock prices. Holding the cost of the option grant to the firm...

We employ a refined tree method to value employee stock options (ESOs) in the stochastic volatility model of Heston. Our setting covers risk-averse employees maximizing expected utility where we in particular focus on subjective option valuation, personal market beliefs and stochastic...

It is well documented in the empirical literature that employee stock options exercise behavior is driven by economic/rational factors as well as by psychological/behavioral factors. The latter include a set of behavioral biases affecting attitudes towards risk. Perhaps the most comprehensive...

Traditional stock option grant is the most common form of incentive pay in executive compensation. Applying a principal-agent analysis, we find this common practice suboptimal and firms are better off linking incentive pay to average stock prices. Among other benefits, averaging reduces...

In the present paper, we analyze two effective non-traditional performance-based stock option schemes which we call Parisian and constrained Asian executives' stock option plans. Both options have a criterion on the terminal value similar to a call option, but in addition impose a restriction on...

This paper examines the reliability of option fair value estimates in the presence of transaction costs. The Black Scholes Merton (BSM) framework assumes zero transaction costs and thus might not provide a reasonable approximation in this context. We investigate the model adjustments companies...

More than half of S&P 500 CEOs receive options annually, however extant valuation models have not accounted for portfolio considerations. We show the inability of executives to diversify means portfolio effects matter: exercise thresholds and shareholder costs are lower than for stand-alone...

This paper examines the incentives from stock options for loss-averse employees subject to probability weighting. Employing the certainty equivalence principle, I built on insights from Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) to derive a continuous time model to value options from the perspective of a...

We examine whether stock option and restricted stock grants motivate higher performance using employee-level data from Google. Employees who received more equity grants than peers hired at the same time and job grade perform slightly better in the future across a variety of measures. To attempt...