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Leniency policies and illegal transactions

Buccirossi, Paolo; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - 2005 - First version: October 1999, Final version: September 8, 2005

We study the consequences of leniency - reduced legal sanctions for wrongdoers who spontaneously self-report to law … known that leniency helps deterring illegal relationships sustained by repeated interaction. Here we find that - when not … properly designed - leniency may simultaneously provide an effective governance mechanism for occasional sequential illegal …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366558

Optimal leniency and the organization design of group crime

Immordino, Giovanni; Piccolo, Salvatore; Roberti, Paolo - In: Journal of public economics 191 (2020), pp. 1-16

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012585475

Accomplice witnesses and organized crime : theory and evidence from Italy

Acconcia, Antonio; Immordino, Giovanni; Piccolo, Salvatore - In: The Scandinavian journal of economics 116 (2014) 4, pp. 1116-1159

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010505414

Corruption, organized crime and the bright side of subversion of law

Gamba, Astrid; Immordino, Giovanni; Piccolo, Salvatore - In: Journal of public economics 159 (2018), pp. 79-88

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012035306

Organized crime and the bright side of subversion of law

Gamba, Astrid; Immordino, Giovanni; Piccolo, Salvatore - 2016

When Legislators introduce laws that award amnesties to 'low-rank' criminals co- operating with the justice, top criminals may bribe public officials to subvert the law. Legislators should anticipate this reaction and fight it back by introducing policies that bundle amnesties for low-rank...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011775869

On Cheating and Whistleblowing

Berentsen, Aleksander; Brügger, Esther; Lörtscher, Simon - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Zentrum <Basel> - 2004

We study the role of whistleblowing in the following inspectiongame. Two agents who compete for a prize can either behave legallyor illegally. After the competition, a controller investigates the agents’behavior. This inspection game has a unique Bayesian equilibriumin mixed strategies. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868295