In an evaluation of a job-training program, the influence of the program on the in-dividual wages is important, because it reflects the program effect on human capital. Esti-mating these effects is complicated because we observe wages only for employed individuals, and employment is itself an...

In an evaluation of a job-training program, the influence of the program on the individual earnings capacity is important, because it reflects the program effect on human capital. Estimating these effects is complicated because earnings are observed for employed individuals only, and employment...

In an evaluation of a job-training program, the influence of the program on the individual earnings capacity is important, because it reflects the program effect on human capital. Estimating these effects is complicated because earnings are observed for employed individuals only, and employment...

In an evaluation of a job-training program, the influence of the program on the individual earnings capacity is important, because it reflects the program effect on human capital. Estimating these effects is complicated because earnings are observed for employed individuals only, and employment...

In an evaluation of a job-training program, the influence of the program on the in-dividual wages is important, because it reflects the program effect on human capital. Esti-mating these effects is complicated because we observe wages only for employed individuals, and employment is itself an...

In an evaluation of a job-training program, the influence of the program on the individual wages is important, because it reflects the program effect on human capital. Estimating these effects is complicated because we observe wages only for employed individuals, and employment is itself an...

In an evaluation of a job-training program, the influence of the program on the individual earnings capacity is important, because it reflects the program effect on human capital. Estimating these effects is complicated because earnings are observed for employed individuals only, and employment...

We structurally estimate a novel job search model with endogenous job search effort, job quality dispersion, and effort monitoring, taking into account that monitoring effects may be mitigated by on-the-job search and search channel substitution. The data are from a randomized experiment...

Building upon the works of Gilboa (1989), Shalev (1997) and De Waegenaere andWakker (2001), we show that a simple version of variation aversion, jointly witha myopia axiom allows to derive in an infinite setting a meaningful expressionfor evaluating income streams. Furthermore, we prove that...

We set up a neoclassical growth model extended by a corporate sector, aninvestment and finance decision of firms, and a set of taxes on capital income. We provideanalytical dynamic scoring of taxes on corporate income, dividends, capital gains, otherprivate capital income, and depreciation...