Information asymmetries make it difficult for banks to assess accurately whetherspecific entrepreneurs are able and/or willing to repay their loans. This leads toimplicit interest rate ceilings, i.e. banks “refuse” to increase their interest ratesbeyond this ceiling as this would lower their...

Preise auf Kapitalmärkten werden durch nicht-antizipierte Informationen getrieben. Eine zentrale Aussage Baysianischer Lernmodelle impliziert, dass die Stärke der Preisreaktion einerseits von der Höhe der nicht antizipierten Komponente abhängt, andererseits aber auch von der Präzision der...

This paper develops a theoretical model of dynamic decision-making of a monetarypolicy committee with heterogeneous members. It investigates the optimal transparency,and the optimal way of transmitting information of committees, by analysing the effectsdifferent communication strategies have on...

We consider a simple extension of the basic new-Keynesian setup in which we relaxthe assumption of frictionless financial markets. In our economy, asymmetricinformation and default risk lead banks to optimally charge a lending rate above therisk-free rate. Our contribution is threefold. First,...

We analyze the role of intermediaries in electronic markets using detailed data of more than 14,000 originated loans on an electronic P2P (peer-to-peer) lending platform. In such an electronic credit market, lenders bid to supply a private loan. Screening of potential borrowers and the...