Job-Market signaling is ranked high among the explanations why individuals engage voluntarily in OSS projects. If true …, signaling implies the existence of a wage premium for OSS engagement. However, due to a lack of data this issue has not been … employees, this paper fills this gap. In the empirical analysis, however, we find no support for the signaling hypothesis, a …

information, job signaling, repeated contribution to the public good and uncertainty in programming. The resulting game does not … feature any delay: software will be provided swiftly, by young, low-cost individuals who gain considerably by signaling their …

contribute. Our difference-in-differences model leverages time differences in incentives for labor market signaling across users … shows signaling incentives motivate first-time OSS contributions. Our findings suggest that signaling incentives on private …

contribute. Our difference-in-differences model leverages time differences in incentives for labor market signaling across users … shows signaling incentives motivate first-time OSS contributions. Our findings suggest that signaling incentives on private …

Job-Market signaling is ranked high among the explanations why in- dividuals engage voluntarily in OSS projects. If … true, signaling implies the existence of a wage premium for OSS engagement. However, due to a lack of data this issue has …,000 German IT employees, this paper fills this gap. In the empirical analysis, however, we find no support for the signaling …

Job-Market signaling is ranked high among the explanations why in- dividuals engage voluntarily in OSS projects. If … true, signaling implies the existence of a wage premium for OSS engagement. However, due to a lack of data this issue has …,000 German IT employees, this paper fills this gap. In the empirical analysis, however, we find no support for the signaling …