The regulation of bank capital in the form of capital adequacy requirements is itself inherently procyclical; it bites in downturns, but fails to restrain in booms. The more risk-sensitive the regulation, the greater the scope for pro-cyclicality to become a problem, particularly in view of the...

Our purpose in this paper is to produce a tractable model which illuminates problems relating to individual bank behaviour and risk-taking, to possible contagious interrelationships between banks, and to the appropriate design of prudential requirements and incentives to limit ‘excessive’...

The objective of this paper is to propose a model to assess risk for banks. Its main innovation is to incorporate endogenous interaction between banks, recognising that the actual risk to which an individual bank is exposed also depends on its interaction with other banks and other private...

Using a new database covering some 91 supervisory agencies, this paper examines how important various skilled experts are in the regulatory process and the relative usage of different kinds of such experts. We seek to explore what kind of perspective supervisors in different institutional...

Most of those who take macro and monetary policy decisions are agents. The worst penalty which can be applied to these agents is to sack them if they are perceived to have failed. To be publicly sacked as a failure is painful, often severely so, but the pain is finite. Agents thus have loss...

This is the first of three prospective papers examining how well forecasters can predict the future time path of short-term interest rates. Most prior work has been done using US data; in this exercise we use forecasts made for New Zealand (NZ) by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ), and those...

In the first of three related, and consecutive, papers we showed that forecasts for short-term policy interest rates in NZ and UK deteriorated over the first six months to a point when they became useless, after the first two quarters. Moreover they were expost biased, underestimating future...

We show, in an exchange economy with default, liquidity constraints and no aggregate uncertainty, that state prices in a complete markets general equilibrium are a function of the supply of liquidity by the Central Bank. Our model is derived along the lines of Dubey and Geanakoplos (1992). Two...