monotonicity condition that is necessary and -- in economic environments -- sufficient for full implementation in ex post …, ex post implementation can be achieved in the direct mechanism. We show by means of two classic examples that ex post … implementation). The single unit auction with interdependent valuations is shown to satisfy ex post monotonicity but not Maskin …

assumptions) sufficient for robust implementation. Robust monotonicity is strictly stronger than both Maskin monotonicity … (necessary and almost sufficient for complete information implementation) and ex post monotonicity (necessary and almost … sufficient for ex post implementation). It is equivalent to Bayesian monotonicity on all type spaces. It requires that there not …

preferences which together with strict ex post incentive compatibility is sufficient to guarantee robust imple­mentation in the … implementation in any mechanism, including indirect ones. The contraction property requires that the interdependence is not too large …

incentive compatibility and the strict single crossing property is sufficient to guarantee robust implementation in the direct … property is also necessary for robust implementation in any mechanism. …

robust implementation. Robust monotonicity is strictly stronger than both Maskin monotonicity (necessary and almost … sufficient for complete information implementation) and ex post monotonicity (necessary and almost sufficient for ex post … implementation). It is equivalent to Bayesian monotonicity on all type spaces. …

together with strict ex post incentive compatibility is sufficient to guarantee robust implementation in the direct mechanism …. Strict EPIC and the contraction property are also necessary for robust implementation in any mechanism. The contraction …

) rationalizable strategies. The monotonicity condition shown by Maskin (1999) to be necessary for Nash implementation is also …This note studies (full) implementation of social choice functions under complete information in (correlated …

We consider the implementation of social choice functions under complete information in rationalizable strategies. A … strict (and thus stronger) version of the monotonicity condition introduced by Maskin (1999) is necessary under the solution …

robust implementation. Robust monotonicity is strictly stronger than both Maskin monotonicity (necessary and almost … sufficient for complete information implementation) and ex post monotonicity (necessary and almost sufficient for ex post … implementation). It is equivalent to Bayesian monotonicity on all type spaces. …