–38] showed that two properties – monotonicity and no veto power – are together sufficient for Nash implementation. In contrast to …

constraint in implementation and all incentive compatible social choice functions are Bayesian implementable. In contrast to the …

constraint in implementation and all incentive compatible social choice functions are Bayesian implementable. In contrast to the …

questions of implementation theory under complete information in a setting with transfers, where farsighted coalitions are … for implementation in general, we show that every monotonic social choice rule can be implemented. These findings imply …

study re-examines the questions of implementation theory in a setting where players’ choice behavior need not be rational …

common-pool resources, and rotation procedures in fair division problems. We study rotation programs via the implementation … between two consecutive states. We provide characterizing conditions for the implementation in rotation programs and show that …, for multi-valued rules, our notion of rotation monotonicity is necessary and sufficient for implementation. Finally, we …