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We consider a differential game of a conflict between two factions who both have a desire to exact revenge. We show …-Palestinian conflict. We also discuss the implications of revenge-dependent preferences for welfare economics and their strategic value as … that, in contrast to conventional wisdom, the desire for revenge need not lead to escalation of conflicts. Surprisingly, in …
We consider a differential game of a conflict between two factions who both have a desire to exact revenge. We show …-Palestinian conflict. We also discuss the implications of revenge-dependent preferences for welfare economics and their strategic value as … that, in contrast to conventional wisdom, the desire for revenge need not lead to escalation of conflicts. Surprisingly, in …
We consider a differential game of a conflict between two factions who both have a desire to exact revenge. We show …-Palestinian conflict. We also discuss the implications of revenge-dependent preferences for welfare economics and their strategic value as … that, in contrast to conventional wisdom, the desire for revenge need not lead to escalation of conflicts. Surprisingly, in …
We develop a theory of interstate conflict in which the degree of genealogical relatedness between populations has a … positive effect on their conflict propensities because more closely related populations, on average, tend to interact more and … that affect conflict, including measures of trade and democracy. …
I study a two-period model of conflict with two combatants and a third party who is an ally of one of the combatants …. There exist perfect Bayesian equilibria in which the third party's intervention worsens the conflict by energizing her ally … to withdraw from or stay in the conflict is based on her prior beliefs and not on the current conditions of the conflict …
can reverse a country's apparent comparative advantage relative to its comparative advantage in the absence of conflict …. And, where such conflict is present, comparisons of autarkic prices to world prices could be inaccurate predictors of …
outside enemy, 'brothers in arms' may already anticipate future internal conflict about dividing the spoils of winning …; however, this subsequent internal conflict does not discourage alliance members from expending much effort in the contest …
In this paper we examine a model of terrorism which focuses on the tradeoffs facing a terrorist organization that has the ability to utilize either or both suicide and conventional terrorism tactics. The terrorist organization's objective is to successfully attack at least one target. Success...
We set out a model of production and appropriation involving many players, who differ with respect to both resource endowments and productivities. We write down the model in a novel way that permits our analysis to avoid the proliferation of dimensions associated with the best response function...