Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 14,823
Cover Image
On the escalation and de-escalation of conflict
Lacomba, Juan A.; Lagos, Francisco; Reuben, Ernesto; … - 2013
We introduce three variations of the Hirshleifer-Skaperdas conflict game to study experimentally the effects of post-conflict … altogether, often after substantial initial conflict. To attain peace, players must first engage in costly signaling by making …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009771751
Cover Image
Wars of conquest and independence
Hodler, Roland; Yektaş, Hadi - 2013
Wars of conquest and wars of independence are characterized by an asymmetric payoff structure: one party gets aggregate production if it wins, and its own production if it loses, while the other party gets only its own production if it wins, and nothing if it loses. We study a model of war with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009754525
Cover Image
Group contests with internal conflict and power asymmetry
Choi, Jay Pil; Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Kim, Jaesoo - 2014
We investigate situations in which players make costly contributions as group members in a group conflict, and at the … asymmetry and complementarity in members'efforts, and analyze how each group's internal conflict in-fluences its chance of … winning in the external conflict. We find that a more symmetric group may expend more effort in external conflict when the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010467392
Cover Image
Democracy and international conflict
Vesperoni, Alberto; Wärneryd, Karl - 2016
nations, as in a strategic game of international conflict handing over military spending decisions to citizens who face a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011452800
Cover Image
Farsightedness in Games : Stabilizing Cooperation in International Conflicts
Brams, Steven J. - 2018
of the 57 2 x 2 strict ordinal conflict games (33%), including Prisoners' Dilemma and Chicken. Auspiciously, in 16 of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012921117
Cover Image
Dynamics of military conflict : an economics perspective
Beckmann, Klaus; Reimer, Lennart - 2014
ways of extending the standard static economic model of conflict to study patterns of conflict dynamics. It turns out that …. In particular, we are unable to study dynamic military conflict as a series of “battles” that are resolved individually … subject to this limitation. Plausible patterns of conflict dynamics emerge, which we can link to both historical conflict and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010239477
Cover Image
Evolutionary determinants of war
Konrad, Kai A.; Morath, Florian - 2013
This paper considers evolutionarily stable decisions about whether to initiate violent conflict rather than accepting a … of peaceful resource allocations that are rejected in favor of violent conflict, compared to the Nash equilibrium …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198498
Cover Image
The fragility of deterrence in conflicts
Denter, Philipp; Sisak, Dana - 2013 - This version: October 2012
We study deterrence in sequential move conflicts, modeled as a contest. We bias the model in favor of peace by assuming that under complete information deterrence is achieved and peace prevails. We show that under incomplete information about states' types (resolve) the chances of deterrence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009791545
Cover Image
Social motives in intergroup conflict
Weisel, Ori; Zultan, Ro'i - 2013
We experimentally test the social motives behind individual participation in intergroup conflict by manipulating the … framing and symmetry of conflict. We find that behavior in conflict depends on whether one is harmed by actions perpetrated by … to do what is good for the group and contribute to the conflict. On the other hand, if people perceive to be personally …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009792169
Cover Image
Better feared than loved : reputations and the motives for conflict
Long, Iain W. - 2014
Throughout history, victory in conflict has created fearsome reputations. With it, the victor ensures greater … motives for conflict. When only victory or defeat is informative, the less scary party may attack to show that they are … tougher than expected. If the occurrence of conflict also conveys information, the scarier party is more likely to attack. By …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010412341