Introducing a threshold in the sense of a minimal project size transforms a public-good game with an inefficient … thresholds are ineffective at best and often counterproductive. This holds over a range of threshold levels and refund rates. We … test whether thresholds perform better if they are endogenously chosen, i.e., whether a threshold is approved in a …

, political attitude, gender and intelligence have a small but sometimes significant influence on voting. …

members use different voting schemes to determine their commitment. To this end, unanimity, qualified majority voting, and … simple majority voting are compared with respect to the resulting public good provision level and social welfare. At first … sight, in line with theoretical predictions, the experiment shows that a change in the voting scheme implemented in a …

We test a mechanism whereby groups are formed voluntarily, through the use of voting. These groups play a public …

laboratory experiments. We find that as long as there is some degree of social fragmentation, increasing it leads to lower public …

We elicit human conditional punishment types by conducting experiments. We find that their punishment decisions to an …

have different, privately observed intensities of preferences and before voting can buy or sell votes among themselves for …

We develop a competitive equilibrium theory of a market for votes. Before voting on a binary issue, individuals may buy … and the market generates welfare losses, relative to simple majority voting, if the committee is large enough. We test the …

interests or direct benefits from voting. The theoretical value of participating in the vote is therefore zero if subjects have … the vote and that they do so for instrumental reasons. The observed voting premium in the main treatment is high and can … model of instrumental voting, which assumes that individuals are overconfident and that they overestimate the errors of …