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This paper examines the ability of a policy maker to control equilibrium outcomes in a global coordination game; applications include currency attacks, bank runs, and debt crises. A unique equilibrium is known to survive when the policy is exogenously fixed. We show that, by conveying...
This paper studies the interaction between monetary and fiscal authorities while investors are coordinating on a speculative attack. The authorities want to achieve specific targets for output and inflation but also to avoid a regime change (i.e. sovereign default). They use the traditional...
This paper studies defense policies in a global-game model of speculative currency attacks. Although the signaling role …
expectations. -- global games ; complementarities ; signaling ; self-fulfilling expectations ; multiple equilibria ; currency …
originates in the signaling role of policy choices. A novel procedure of iterated elimination of non-equilibrium strategies is …
originates in the signaling role of policy choices. A novel procedure of iterated elimination of non-equilibrium strategies is …
originates in the signaling role of policy choices. A novel procedure of iterated elimination of non-equilibrium strategies is …
originates in the signaling role of policy choices. A novel procedure of iterated elimination of non-equilibrium strategies is …
originates in the signaling role of policy choices. A novel procedure of iterated elimination of non-equilibrium strategies is …
originates in the signaling role of policy choices. A novel procedure of iterated elimination of non-equilibrium strategies is …