The motivation of this paper comes from repeated games with incomplete information and imperfect monitoring. It concerns the existence, for any payoff function, of a particular equilibrium (called completely revealing) allowing each player to learn the state of nature. We consider thus an...

In this article, we present a reference case of mean field games. This case can be seen as a reference for two main reasons. First, the case is simple enough to allow for explicit resolution: Bellman functions are quadratic, stationary measures are normal and stability can be dealt with...

We consider the evaluation of a business process quality, focusing on the robustness facet that is a very important quality dimension in this context. Our goal is to define metrics taking tacit knowledge into account. For this, we (re-)use informations coming from an existing structural analysis...

As the workshop’s fourth session will concentrate on the subject of rules and regulations in organizations. In the context of global competition and the global crisis experienced by most countries all over the world, one of the question raised is how linking materiality with discourse,...

We study the existence of uniform correlated equilibrium payoffs in stochastic games. The correlation devices that we use are either autonomous (they base their choice of signal on previous signals, but not on previous states or actions) or stationary (their choice is independent of any data and...

This note establishes that in every 3-3 symmetric game, the replicator dynamics eliminates all strategies that are never used in correlated equilibrium. This extends to the best-response dynamics and to any convex monotonic dynamics. The proof is based on dual reduction.

We study a two-person zero-sum game where players simultaneously choose sequences of actions, and the overall payoff is the average of a one-shot payoff over the joint sequence. We consider the maxmin value of the game played in pure strategies by boundedly rational players and model bounded...

We characterize the set of communication equilibrium payoffs of any undiscounted repeated matrix-game with imperfect monitoring and complete information. For two-player games, a characterization is provided by Mertens, Sorin, and Zamir (Repeated games, Part A (1994) CORE DP 9420), mainly using...